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ABSTRACT
Information and data have always been valuable to businesses, but
in the Information Age, as businesses have figured out more ways to
commoditize the information and data they possess, there has been a
corresponding increase in expressed concerns about the unauthorized
“disclosure” of information. Often, these concerns are expressed in
absolute terms, as if any unauthorized disclosure of information
* Robins-Kaplan LLP Distinguished Professor of IP Law and Director of the IP Institute at Mitchell
Hamline School of Law. The ideas expressed in this article were first set forth with respect to trade
secret law in my article, “Lost in the Cloud? Information Flows and the Implications of Cloud
Computing for Trade Secret Protection”, Sharon K. Sandeen, Lost in the Cloud? Information Flows
and the Implications of Cloud Computing for Trade Secret Protection 19 Va. J. L. & Tech. 1 (2014).
A version of this article under the title “Disclosure” is included as a chapter in the Research Guide to
Information Law (Sandeen, Rademacher, Ohly eds.) published by Edward Elgar in 2021. I am grateful
to Edward Elgar for allowing me to re-publish that work in this form. I am also grateful for the
assistance of the research librarians at MHSL and my research assistants, Joseph Dietz, Akina Khan,
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Washington & Lee University in February 2020 and the IP Scholars Workshop hosted by the
University of Akron in December of 2020.
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constitutes an act of unfair competition or theft. The problem is that the
common understanding of disclosure, particularly among information
owners that seek to restrict access to the information they possess, belies
the legal meaning of the term as used in various contexts.
Sometimes, but not as often as information owners/possessors assert,
the disclosure of information will result in the loss of associated rights in
the information, but other times it will not. This can happen, for instance,
when no legal rights attach to a specified body of information, or when
any rights that do attach (like copyrights) continue to exist even if there is
a disclosure of the information.
Because different areas of information law have developed different
meanings of the term disclosure (and related terms, like “publication”),
it is important for scholars, courts, and litigants to understand those
meanings and use them properly. Otherwise, there is a risk that claims of
wrongful disclosure of information will unduly influence policymakers
and judges to favor the claims of information owners/possessors over
those who are entitled to access and use the subject information. In other
words, the limitations that exist on the scope of various information rights
should not be overshadowed by the rhetoric of loss and theft when no such
loss or theft is possible.
This article begins by first illustrating the different ways that the term
“disclosure” is used in law, using trade secret law, patent law, and
copyright law as case studies. It concludes by setting forth a typology of
disclosure that should be used to explain the legal consequences of acts
of disclosure for various types of information. Only Type-L disclosures
(those that result in the loss of associated information rights) fit the
rhetoric of information owners/possessors.
I. INTRODUCTION
The discourse surrounding information and data, 1 and claimed rights
therein, is often expressed as a binary choice between confidentiality or
secrecy on one hand and disclosure or publication (and the loss of
associated rights) on the other. Typically, the owners/holders of
confidential information assert that their rights and interests will be
destroyed if “their” information is disclosed and accordingly, 2 that courts
1. The word “information” is used throughout the remainder of this paper to refer to both
information and data, as data is a type of information.
2. Because information is not always considered to be property, and even when it is the person
or company that asserts the property rights may not own those rights, it is important not to
automatically attribute the status of ownership to information holders. Thus, “owners/holders” is used
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should act to protect those rights by preventing any disclosure. In addition,
when the information is characterized as property, the actual or threatened
act of disclosure is often described as theft or destruction of property. Seen
in this light, the word disclosure is a loaded term in information law
discourse with rhetorical power that can obscure the real issues in dispute.
The principal reason why the word disclosure is a loaded term is due
to its commonly understood meaning, a meaning that is often different
from the applicable legal definition. Commonly understood and used, the
word disclosure is thought to connote a public revelation of some type or
a dedication of the information to the public, but the dictionary and legal
definitions of disclosure do not always require such publicness. Indeed, in
many situations it is possible for information to be disclosed to another,
including government officials, without the information becoming public.
Thus, in many areas of information law3 the applicable definitions of
disclosure (or publication) are inconsistent with a binary choice between
legal protection or loss of rights; rather, there is a middle ground. In fact,
the word disclosure is frequently used in different senses within one area
of law.
Within different fields of information law, the word disclosure may
be a term of art with a meaning that does not comport with any dictionary
definitions or the meaning commonly ascribed to it by information
owners/holders. Understanding the meaning of disclosure in information
law is further complicated by the fact that, although litigants and courts
frequently characterize various acts as disclosures, often the subject
statutes do not use that word. For instance, in copyright law it is more
common to use the word publication. 4 Similar words might also be used,
including “shared,” “sharing,” and “transferred.” Making matters worse,
the word disclosure is not always defined by statutes that use it and there
are multiple dictionary meanings of the word that are used in different
contexts.
Because of the different uses, meanings, and legal effects of both the
word disclosure and the effects of an act of disclosure throughout
throughout this article to acknowledge this critical factual issue. In many cases, mere holders of
information do not have any standing to complain about the actual or threatened loss of the
information.
3. As used herein, “information law” concerns the laws that govern how information (broadly
defined) is created, collected, organized, protected, secured, accessed, shared, transmitted used, and
discarded by businesses and governments. It also concerns related public policy issues that should
inform policymaking, primarily the public interests in information access, diffusion, and transparency
and each of our individual interests in information privacy. See SHARON K. SANDEEN & DAVID S.
LEVINE, INFO. LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND CYBERSECURITY, 39 (West Academic 2019).
4. See infra, Part III.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 5

660

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[54:657

information law, it is important for all—but particularly those who own
or hold information, their lawyers, and the judges who consider
information-related cases—to exercise care when talking about
information disclosure. At least five questions should be answered: (1)
What is the claimed act of disclosure and does it involve an element of
publicness?; (2) What is the information that is (or will be) subject to the
act of disclosure?; (3) Is the information factually confidential or secret?;
(4) What is the applicable common law or statutory meaning of disclosure,
if any?; and (5) If an act of disclosure occurs as defined, what is the legal
effect of that act? Importantly, if the information is not confidential or
secret then questions (4) and (5) need not be answered because the general
rule is that information once revealed to the public is free for anyone to
use. 5 Rather, with respect to such information, the relevant question is
whether the publicly disclosed information is protected under law—for
instance, patent or copyright law—such that its use is limited.
Given the breadth of information law, it is not possible in this
relatively short article to answer each of the questions posed above with
respect to all the areas of law where disclosure is discussed. Nor is it
possible to engage in an in-depth analysis of the jurisprudence of
disclosure in the areas of law that are discussed. Rather, the purpose of
this article is to illustrate how concepts of disclosure are used and defined
in different information law settings in order to highlight the need for the
proposed typology of disclosure. Importantly, it will show that concepts
of disclosure in information law are sometimes narrower or broader than
the prevalent meaning ascribed to the word by information
owners/holders. It also explains why it is important to understand and
properly apply the different meanings of disclosure.
Understanding the different meanings of disclosure used in
information law is important for the simple reason that not all information
is protected by law. Thus, concerns regarding the loss of information
rights due to acts of disclosure should never arise with respect to
information for which protection is unavailable or nonexistent. For
instance, this can occur when an information owner/holder claims rights

5. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 624 (1834) (“An individual who thus mingles what cannot
be exclusively enjoyed, with what can, does, upon familiar principles, rather forfeit the power over
his own peculiar work, than throw the chain around that which is of itself as free as air.”); Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 149 (1989) (“Once an inventor has decided to
lift the veil of secrecy from his work, he must choose the protection of a federal patent or the
dedication of his idea to the public at large.”).
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in information that is: (1) not factually confidential or secret; 6 (2) is in the
public domain; or (3) constitutes prior art. However, if some information
rights attach to a given body of information, there are four principal senses
in which the word disclosure is used in information law cases.
First, the word disclosure is often used to describe an action that
results in the loss of applicable legal protections in the subject
information. This is how plaintiffs in trade secret cases, litigants seeking
a protective order, and companies opposing freedom of information
requests typically describe the consequences of them sharing information
with another. But in some areas of information law, the disclosure of
information does not result in the loss of related information rights. For
instance, although there are various legal consequences associated with
the publication of copyright-protected works, 7 the copyrights in published
works are not destroyed as a result of the disclosure of the work. 8 There
may be other reasons to treat such information as confidential or subject
to a protective order, but it wouldn’t be because of a loss of rights due to
the disclosure of the copyright-protected content. Even under trade secret
law, it is possible for information to be shared with another person or
wrongfully acquired without a loss of trade secret rights, for instance,
when it is shared (some would say “disclosed”) pursuant to a duty of
confidentiality.
Second, the word disclosure is often used to describe actions that
result in the public dissemination of information. However, as just noted,
6. As explained more fully in Part III, even confidential and secret information may not be
protected by law unless it meets the other two requirements of trade secrecy. That is because the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), applicable in nearly all U.S. states, precludes any other tort or
equitable claims related to confidential or secret information except a trade secret or breach of contract
claim. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 7, 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2018) [hereinafter the UTSA].
Although primarily used in discussions of copyright law, the classic definition of “the public domain”
is information that is unprotected by intellectual property (IP) law. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson,
Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 Law & Contemporary Probs.
147, 149 (2003) (defining the public domain as “a sphere in which contents are free from intellectual
property rights”). This could include information that can never be protected by a form of IP (see,
e.g., Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1501 (2020) (discussing the government
edicts doctrine which holds that certain works are ineligible for copyright protection) or information
for which applicable protections have ended (see, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. 446,
446 (2015), referring to a “post-expiration . . . public domain.”). However, as further explained
below, just because information enters the public domain doesn’t necessarily mean that it has been
publicly disclosed. See infra note 14.
7. See Deborah Gerhardt, Copyright at the Museum: Using the Publication Doctrine to Free
Art and History, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S. 393–451 (2014); Deborah Gerhardt, Copyright
Publication: An Empirical Study, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 135 (2011).
8. As explained in Part III, C, before March 1, 1989 in the U.S., publication of a copyright
protected work without a proper copyright notice resulted in a loss of copyrights, but the act of
publication was typically at the behest of the copyright owner.
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whether these actions result in the loss of associated information rights
depends upon the type of information rights, if any, that attach to the
subject information. The public dissemination of information will destroy
trade secret rights, confidentiality, and some privacy interests, but these
are not always the types of behaviors that are at issue in information law
cases. Some rights in information, principally patent rights and
copyrights, continue to exist despite the public dissemination of the
information and depending upon the nature and scope of the
dissemination. Conversely, some rights in information cease to exist even
if the information is not “publicly” disseminated, for instance when
inventors commercialize their secret inventions without timely filing for
a patent 9 and when copyrights expire for unpublished works. 10 In these
situations, rights in information can be lost even if the information is not
publicly disclosed.
Third, the acts of disclosures that are at issue in information law cases
often involve the sharing of information between the information
owner/holder and another that does not result in the public dissemination
of the information or, in trade secret parlance, that does not make the
information “generally known” among the public or within an industry.
Once again, whether the information that is shared continues to enjoy the
legal protections that attach to it, if any, depends upon the type of
information involved and whether it was shared in the context of a
relationship that gives rise to a duty of confidentiality. If the information
was protected by copyright or patent rights, the fact that the information
was shared will not adversely affect those rights. The sharing of
confidential information without first establishing a duty of
confidentiality, however, can undermine trade secret protection, privacy
rights, and the ability to claim that the information is confidential.
Relatedly, when we say that information “enters the public domain” 11 or
9. See the “forfeiture doctrine” of Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & AP Co.,
153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946) and Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 139 S.
Ct. 628 (2019).
10. As explained in Part III, C before the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act on January
1, 1978, copyrights in the U.S. were acquired by either publication or registration of the work, but in
both cases, the works were disclosed in the sense that they became available to the public. Since
January 1, 1978, unpublished original works of authorship that are fixed in tangible form are
automatically protected by U.S. copyright law for the prescribed term. At the end of such term, they
technically enter the public domain in the sense that they are no longer protected by copyright law,
but there is no requirement that they be publicly disclosed.
11. Like the word “disclosure,” the term “public domain” is often misused to refer to
information that is publicly disclosed, but this is not its common technical meaning. Also, although
primarily used in copyright law, conceptually it has a broader application. It is frequently referred to
as “the body of ideas and works that are not subject to intellectual property protection.” Tyler T.
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“becomes prior art,” it does not necessarily mean that the information has
been publicly disclosed. Under both patent and copyright law, information
may cease being protected even if it is not publicly disclosed. 12
Fourth, sometimes the word disclosure is used when the more apt
word would be “transferred.” In these situations, the word disclosed is
used to describe the transfer of information from one location to another,
for instance, when it is stored on the computer server of a company that
provides cloud storage solutions or in boxes in a climate-controlled
warehouse. 13 In these cases, the information is technically available to be
accessed by the storage providers and, in that sense, the information has
been shared with them. But, if the storage providers do not access and read
the information, the information arguably has not been disclosed in a
manner that allows for human (or even machine) cognition. Also, this
shared information typically is not disclosed to the public.
There are obvious policy choices involved in whether and how
various acts of disclosure waive applicable legal rights in the subject
information, with the third-party doctrine of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence under U.S. law being an obvious example. 14 This article
does not address those policy choices. Rather, taking the law and policy
choices as they currently are, it advocates for greater clarity concerning
the types and ranges of disclosures that are at issue in information law
cases. Clearly, not all acts of disclosure are treated as a loss of rights. How
then should we label these types of disclosure to differentiate them from
disclosures that do result in a loss of rights? And what do we call acts that
fall somewhere between the two extremes, allowing for the sharing or
transfer of information under conditions that do not result in the loss of
applicable information rights? Finally, how should we label information
that is not protected by law such that no type of disclosure matters from a
legal perspective?
To sort out the different meanings, uses, and effects of information
disclosing acts, this article proposes a typology of disclosure that will
allow litigants, judges, scholars, and policymakers to more easily
differentiate between acts that result in disclosures of information that
Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 217 (2002). See
also, Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 149 (2003) (defining the public domain as “a sphere in which contents are
free from intellectual property rights”).
12. See infra, Part III.
13. Sharon K. Sandeen, Lost in the Cloud? Information Flows and the Implications of Cloud
Computing for Trade Secret Protection, 19 VA. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2014).
14. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561
(2009).
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result in the loss of associated rights, and those that do not. 15 As further
explained in Part IV, it specifies five different types of disclosure,
denominated with letters that correspond with the legal protection, if any,
that the information possesses following the corresponding act of
disclosure. The five types are: (1) Type-L for acts of disclosure that result
in the loss (L) of rights in the subject information; (2) Type-P for acts of
disclosure that do not result in a loss of rights because the information
remains protected (P) notwithstanding being disclosed; (3) Type-C for
information disclosures made to a person or entity who is under a duty of
confidentiality (C), therefore not resulting in a loss of rights; (4) Type-T
for information that is merely transferred (T) from one physical or digital
location to another, but in a way that does not involve the exercise of
human cognition by the recipient and holder of the information such that
they gain any information or knowledge from the disclosure; and (5)
Type-X disclosures that concern acts related to information that, due to
the various limitations of information law, is not protected by law. An
important proviso is that some information, and particularly compilations
of information, may involve multiple types of information and
disclosures.
The article begins in Part II with a discussion of the meaning of
disclosure from various dictionaries, showing how there are different
definitions and how those definitions do not always comport with the
common assertions of information owners/holders. Part III discusses the
various ways that disclosure (or publication) is used in three different
fields of information law: trade secret law, patent law, and copyright law.
In Part IV, the proposed typology of disclosure is further explained. Part
V provides suggestions for how the typology should be used in practice
and, in so doing, demonstrates that information owners/holders should not
always fear the disclosure of the information they own or hold. The article
concludes with Part VI.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS
The U.S. Supreme Court is apt to emphasize, particularly of late, that
in the absence of a definition in the statute itself, words in a statute should

15. This article pays homage to two earlier works: Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital
Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.147 (2003) and Daniel J.
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006). Both articles addressed a common
problem in legal discourse and information law; namely, the need to understand and define terms and
concepts and use them precisely and consistently. It is only then that a discussion of applicable legal
consequences and policy choices are possible.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss3/5

8

Sandeen: A Typology of Disclosure

2020]

A TYPOLOGY OF DISCLOSURE

665

be given their common meanings and that a dictionary from the time when
the statute was enacted is a good source for that meaning. 16 A stated
reason for this approach is that when a statute does not define a term it
should be assumed that the legislators intended the common meaning, and
to attribute a different meaning to the term would amount to judicial
lawmaking. But there are several problems with this approach, which even
the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged. First, when you look up a
word in the dictionary it often has several meanings and, thus, how does
one know which meaning was intended by the legislators? 17 Moreover,
which of many possible dictionaries did the legislators have in mind, since
there is no official dictionary of the United States? 18 To answer these
questions, the Supreme Court often looks for clues elsewhere, for
instance, by reading the word in the context of the entire statute, 19
considering the purpose of the statute, 20 or looking (often reluctantly) at
legislative history. 21 The Court might also look to industry-specific
dictionaries for meaning, like Black’s Law Dictionary, even if it is not
clear that the legislators were familiar with those specialized
dictionaries. 22
Looking up the meaning of “disclosure” illustrates the confusion that
dictionary definitions can cause when interpreting a statute that uses the
term. According to most dictionaries, the word disclosure connotes some
form of revelation, but how much and to whom they really do not say. For
instance, the Merriam-Webster dictionary defines disclosure as “an act or
instance of disclosing: EXPOSURE” or “something disclosed;
REVELATION.” 23 Similarly, according to Black’s Law Dictionary,
16. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (“The
term [], being left undefined by the statute, carries its ordinary meaning.”); Perrin v. United States,
444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (“[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute”). See also,
Mark A. Lemley, Chief Justice Webster, 106 IOWA L. REV. 299 (2020) (describing the Supreme
Court’s recent turn toward dictionaries to determine the “ordinary meaning” of words in statutes).
17. See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 241–42
(1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out that a different definition from one of the same
dictionaries used by the majority would allow for a different ruling, stating: “The Court seizes upon
a particular sense of the word ‘modify’ at the expense of another, long-established meaning that fully
supports the Commission’s position.”).
18. Id. at 225–28 (debating which dictionary definitions are applicable to the statute).
19. See United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988).
20. Id. at 373–74.
21. See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 477 U.S. 102, 110–16
(1980) (using legislative history to refute petitioner’s interpretation of a statute).
22. See, e.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp., 512 U.S. at 225 (1994).
23. Disclosure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (10th ed. 1995).
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disclosure is defined as “the act or process of making known something
that was previously unknown; a revelation of facts.” 24 The word exposure
is defined by Merriam-Webster to include “the condition of being
presented to view or made known.” Similarly, the word revelation is
defined, in one sense, as “the act of revealing to view or making known.” 25
But none of these definitions say anything about the relative publicness of
the disclosed, exposed, or revealed information.
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) definition, on the other hand,
alludes to the disclosure as making information publicly known, defining
disclosure as “the action or fact of disclosing or revealing new or secret
information; the action of making something openly known.” 26 However,
even here there is nothing defining how widely known the disclosure has
to be to be “openly known.” Importantly, the OED also notes that
disclosure is often used attributively as “designating documents in which
a formal or legal statement is made disclosing certain information, or legal
processes in which such a declaration is required; as disclosure form,
disclosure hearing, disclosure statement, etc.” 27 Numerous federal and
state statutes and regulations require such disclosures to designated
persons or entities, but not always including the general public.
Because none of the foregoing definitions identify to whom the
information is disclosed or how broadly it must be revealed, the dictionary
definitions of disclosure are largely inconsistent with the views of many
information owners/holders that disclosure means making information
available to the public when, in fact, only the word disclosure preceded
by the adjective “publicly” does. Even then, however, what disclosure
means in different areas of information law often differs from both the
dictionary definitions of disclosure and the common understanding of
publicly disclosed. Sometimes, for important public policy reasons,
certain information is treated as disclosed or publicly disclosed even
though it is only revealed to a select few or is revealed to no one; in effect,
being treated as constructively disclosed to the public even if it was never
actually disclosed to the public. These specialized meanings as used in
certain fields are what are known as “terms of art” and they are prevalent
in law.
The fact that certain fields, including law, frequently use terms of art
highlights the importance of specialized dictionaries in some instances
24.
25.
1995).
26.
27.

Disclosure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
Exposure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (10th ed. 1995); Revelation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (10th ed.
Disclosure, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
Id.
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and explains why they are sometimes consulted to give meaning to
statutory words. However, context matters. For instance, under U.S.
patent claim construction jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit rejected
reliance on dictionary definitions in favor of applicable technical
definitions in the patent claims and specifications (intrinsic evidence) or,
secondarily, in specialized dictionaries and treatises (extrinsic
evidence). 28 Similarly, when statutes use terminology that had a common
law meaning at the time the statute was enacted, U.S. courts often apply
the common law definition of the terms even if they do not comport with
applicable dictionary definitions. 29 Justice Gorsuch acknowledged as
much in the Argus Leader decision when he listed “dictionary definitions,
early case law, or any other usual source” as possible sources for the
meaning of undefined words in a statute. 30 Because statutory words often
have specialized meanings in a particular field of law, it is important to
understand what those meanings are and apply them correctly.
III. THE MANY MEANINGS OF DISCLOSURE IN INFORMATION LAW
There are many areas of law where questions concerning the
disclosure of information arise. For instance, every time an individual or
business is required to provide information to a governmental entity,
information is shared and potentially made available to the public
pursuant to freedom of information acts and sunshine laws. When an
individual or business initiates a lawsuit, applicable rules of pleading,
discovery, and evidence require lots of information to be exchanged
between the litigants and filed with the court. The information that
businesses require customers and clients to provide raises important
concerns about the privacy of the disclosed (or shared) information. While
laws and regulations exist that require or enable certain types of
information to be kept from public disclosure under specified conditions
(for instance, Protective Orders 31), there are also many laws and legal
principles in the U.S. and elsewhere that encourage and facilitate the
disclosure of information to the public. U.S. patent law 32 and the U.S.
28. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2020); See, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en banc). See also, Mark A. Lemley, Chief Justice Webster, 106 IOWA L. REV. 299 (2020).
29. United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 162 (2014) (“It is a settled principle of
interpretation that, absent other indication, ‘Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning
of the common-law terms it uses.’”); See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 739–740 (1989) (applying the common law definition of “employee”).
30. Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2363 (2019).
31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
32. See infra, Part III, B.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 5

668

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[54:657

Freedom of Information Act 33 are two obvious examples. All these laws
and regulations constitute what is referred to herein as “information law,”
but to illustrate how the word disclosure can be used and defined
differently in different legal contexts, this article focuses on the following
three areas of information law: trade secret law, patent law, and copyright
law.
A.

Trade Secret Law

Trade secret law in the U.S. was developed at common law but is
now largely governed by two statutes which incorporate most of the
common law principles: (1) The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)
which has been adopted by 48 states, and (2) the federal Defend Trade
Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA). 34 Both statutes use the word “disclose” in
the definition of misappropriation to describe one of three acts that may
subject someone to liability for trade secret misappropriation, the other
two being “acquisition” and “use.” 35 However, nowhere in the UTSA or
the DTSA is the word disclose defined. Rather, as the caselaw has
developed, disclose for purposes of trade secret misappropriation means
an act by the defendant that results in the subject information losing its
trade secret protection, and not acts whereby information is shared
pursuant to obligations of confidentiality. 36 This is because it is the loss
of trade secret protection that is one type of harm upon which remedies
for trade secret misappropriation can be measured.37
Often in trade secret cases, the meaning of disclose for
misappropriation purposes never becomes an issue in the case because the
plaintiff cannot prove the existence of a trade secret in the first instance.
Unfortunately, this is a situation where the words disclose or disclosure
are often used but with varying meanings that do not always comport with
dictionary meanings, and where the legal effect of the acts of disclosure
vary depending upon the circumstances. Thus, to understand the concept
of disclosure in trade secret law, and when it is appropriate to use the word
33. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).
34. See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error
When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493 (2010); Sharon
K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward A Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2017).
35. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1(2).
36. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1 cmt. (“Because the trade secret can be destroyed through public
knowledge, the unauthorized disclosure of a trade secret is also a misappropriation.”).
37. The other type of potential harm upon which remedies for trade secret misappropriation
can be measured relates to the unauthorized use of the trade secrets. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1(2).
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disclosure to connote a loss of trade secrecy (a Type-L disclosure),
requires an understanding of the definition of a trade secret. Moreover, as
will be seen, whether an act is a disclosure that results in a loss of trade
secrecy often depends upon who is engaging in those acts: the putative
trade secret owner, the misappropriator, or a third party. To differentiate
between these circumstances, care must be taken not to use the word
disclosure unless a loss of trade secrecy results or to identify and label the
type of disclosure that is involved pursuant to the typology that is set forth
in this article.
For instance, a plaintiff in a trade secret case, rather than speaking
generally about disclosure would say, “I fear a Type-L disclosure that will
result in a loss of trade secret rights.” The defendant might respond,
“There is no risk of a Type-L disclosure because the subject information
is either otherwise protected by law (a Type-P disclosure) or will only be
disclosed pursuant to a protective order (a Type-C disclosure).” Or the
defendant might challenge the plaintiff’s assertion of trade secrecy and
argue that the disclosure of the information would be a Type-X disclosure
because the information is not protected by any type of information law.
Under both the UTSA and the DTSA, information is not protected as
a trade secret unless it meets three requirements. First, the information
cannot be “generally known or readily ascertainable.” 38 As is further
explained below, this requirement equates most with public perceptions
of disclosure, but it alone does not determine trade secrecy. In addition,
the subject information must have independent economic value because
of its secrecy and be of value to others. 39 The information must also be
the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. 40
With regard to the first requirement, trade secret protection is not
available for information that has already been made public either by the
putative trade secret owner or another (including a misappropriator) such
that it becomes “generally known.” 41 Moreover, under longstanding trade
secret doctrine, generally known information has a broad definition that
includes that which is known to the general public (the common
understanding of publicly disclosed), as well as that which is known
within discrete industries.42 Additionally, while common definitions of
38. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1(4)(i); 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B).
39. Id.
40. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1(4)(ii); 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A).
41. Kewanee Oil. Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479–80 (1974).
42. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1 cmt. (“The language ‘not being generally known to and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons’ does not require that information be
generally known to the public for trade secret rights to be lost. If the principal persons who can obtain
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disclosure are often equated with public dissemination, the concept that
information is not a trade secret if it is “readily ascertainable” does not
require broad public dissemination. 43 Rather, it recognizes that
information may not be generally known by the public or within an
industry, but still is effectively disclosed for trade secret purposes if it can
be easily found in publicly accessible materials such as scientific journals,
books, or on websites. This is true even if no one has actually accessed
the information. 44 Generally, the ease with which information is
discoverable (or knowable) is the dividing line between whether
information loses its trade secret status immediately upon becoming
ascertainable, or whether it only loses its trade secret status when it has
actually been found or reversed engineered and thereafter made generally
known. 45
Based on the foregoing, the word disclosure can be used in trade
secret litigation in at least four different senses. First, it can determine the
consequences of a misappropriator’s actions; namely, whether an act of
misappropriation occurred because the defendant disclosed the subject
information as prohibited by the UTSA’s and DTSA’s definition of
misappropriation. This type of disclosure requires an act that results in the
loss of trade secrecy, which means that the information becomes generally
known or readily ascertainable because of the misappropriator’s actions.
Second, the word disclosure is often used in trade secret cases to refer
to acts that lead to information becoming generally known, which is
consistent with the common understanding of disclosure as connoting
public dissemination. But as previously noted, disclosure resulting in a
loss of trade secrecy can occur even without the widespread dissemination
or availability of the alleged trade secrets, so long as the information is
generally known within the relevant industry or, if not, is readily
ascertainable by the general public or the relevant industry.

economic benefit from information are aware of it, there is no trade secret. A method of casting metal,
for example, may be unknown to the general public but readily known within the foundry industry.”).
43. See UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1(4)(i), cmt. Some states, most notably California, do not
analyze the ascertainability of information as part of plaintiff’s prima facie proof of trade secrecy, but
rather, frame the issue as a defense. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (Deering 1994). This distinction
does not affect the current discussion, however, because it concerns the broader and more abstract
issue of what constitutes “disclosed” information under trade secret law.
44. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1 cmt. (“Information is readily ascertainable if it is available in
trade journals, reference books, or published materials.”).
45. Weins v. Sporleder, 569 N.W.2d 16, 21 (S.D. 1997) (quoting Computer Care v. Serv. Sys.
Enterprises, Inc., 982 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1992)) (“[I]f the information can be readily duplicated
without involving considerable time, effort or expense, then it is not secret.”).
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Third, disclosure in the trade secret sense can mean that the
information has become readily ascertainable, which means something
different from generally known but which has the same legal effect as if
the information was publicly disclosed. Because this information, by
definition, is not generally known, plaintiffs in trade secret cases typically
believe it is still a trade secret, not understanding that the information
could have been made readily ascertainable by a third party. This might
happen, for instance, where the plaintiff keeps information secret, but a
third party independently develops the same information and reveals it in
their PhD thesis which becomes a part of a library’s catalogue of
accessible works. Importantly, unlike patent law where the relevant prior
art is defined as of a specific date, under trade secret law, the status of
information as a trade secret can change at any time as information
becomes generally known and readily ascertainable.
Lastly, disclosure in trade secret cases can connote actions by the
putative trade secret owner that trigger the requirement to engage in
reasonable efforts to keep the information secret, even if the subject
information does not become generally known or readily ascertainable.
This happens, for instance, when a trade secret owner decides to use its
trade secrets in its business or share it with others outside the business. In
trying to meet the reasonable efforts requirement, putative trade secret
owners will often argue that their information was kept secret and never
disclosed. But due to the particularities of the reasonable efforts
requirement, how a putative trade secret owner handles its information
may result in it not being protected as a trade secret even if the information
is never publicly disclosed. That is because secret information is not
deemed a trade secret unless reasonable efforts were engaged in to keep it
secret. One reason for this rule is the notice function of the reasonable
efforts requirement which generally requires efforts that are sufficient to
put the recipients and users of trade secret information on notice of
applicable confidentiality obligations.
While the acts of a putative trade secret owner often result in
disclosure such that the information becomes generally known or readily
ascertainable, the public availability of the information is not required
when a trade secret owner voluntarily transfers information to a third party
without first establishing a duty of confidentiality.46 This is due to the
46. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (first quoting Harrington v. Natl.
Outdoor Advertising Co., 196 S.W.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1946); then quoting MILGRIM ON TRADE
SECRETS § 1.01[2] (1983)) (“If an individual discloses his trade secret to others who are under no
obligation to protect the confidentiality of the information, or otherwise publicly discloses the secret,
his property right is extinguished.”).
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various functions of the reasonable efforts requirement, including its
notice, due process, and legitimacy functions. 47 A broad definition of
disclosure with respect to voluntary, non-accidental owner-initiated acts
is also consistent with notions of fairness and judicial efficiency; fairness
in giving those who might be found responsible for misappropriating trade
secrets advance notice of their obligations and judicial efficiency in not
clogging the courts with litigation to protect information that its
owner/holder did not take steps to protect. Thus, if such information is
misappropriated, there is no trade secret claim even if the information is
otherwise secret.
When used in these different senses, the word disclosure can lead to
confusion in trade secret cases because the legal meaning of the term is
different from the common or dictionary meanings. As noted, a trade
secrecy destroying disclosure does not require public disclosure as that
term is used in common or dictionary vernacular. Instead, the information
will be deemed unprotectable information if: (1) it was generally known,
even if only among those in a discrete industry; (2) it is readily
ascertainable; (3) it does not have economic value due to its secrecy; or
(4) it was not the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.
Thus, the information may be confidential in a factual sense, but it is not
a qualifying trade secret the disclosure of which we care about in the
absence of an enforceable contractual duty of confidence. But then the
claim is for breach of contract, not trade secret misappropriation. 48
Further complicating the meaning of disclosure under trade secret
law is the frequent desire of putative trade secret owners not to have acts
of misappropriation treated as trade secrecy destroying disclosures.
Where trade secrets exist and their wrongful acquisition, disclosure, or use
is suspected, trade secret owners should act quickly to prevent any trade
secrecy destroying acts of disclosure or use by obtaining appropriate
injunctive relief; the goal being to prevent the information from becoming
generally known or readily ascertainable. If dissemination of the subject

47. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The
remedial significance of such efforts lies in the fact that if the plaintiff has allowed his trade secret to
fall into the public domain, he would enjoy a windfall if permitted to recover damages merely because
the defendant took the secret from him, rather than from the public domain as it could have done with
impunity.” (Internal citations omitted)); See, e.g., Aries Info. Sys., Inc. v. Pac. Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 366
N.W.2d 366, 367 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that reasonable efforts of plaintiff technology
company including contract terms and proprietary notice clearly establish that defendant employees
were aware of trade secret status of contested software development).
48. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 7 (limiting claims for the misappropriation of competitively
significant confidential information to breach of contract and trade secret misappropriation claims).
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information by the alleged misappropriator did occur, the question arises
whether there was a trade secrecy destroying disclosure.
Many courts have held that the acts of misappropriators do not
constitute trade secrecy destroying disclosures unless the trade secrets
become generally known or readily ascertainable.49 This may be true even
if the information was widely shared and used within the
misappropriator’s company. This approach makes sense from a policy
perspective because it provides a window of time in which a trade secret
owner can attempt to protect its rights following acts of
misappropriation. 50 Typically, this would include an injunction addressed
to all the people known to have possessed or used the trade secret. But it
also demonstrates how acts that would be considered trade secrecy
destroying disclosures when committed by a putative trade secret owner
may not be treated the same way when committed by a misappropriator.
Another form of disclosure which tends not to be treated harshly
under trade secret law, but which nonetheless often results in the loss of
trade secrecy, concerns accidental disclosures. According to longstanding
trade secret doctrine, a trade secret owner who accidentally discloses trade
secrets to a third party may be able to avoid the trade secrecy disqualifying
effects of their inadvertence if the information did not become generally
known or readily ascertainable and they act quickly to prevent further
dissemination of the information. 51 Pursuant to the UTSA, the third party
possessor of accidentally acquired information may be liable for trade
secret misappropriation unless the third party changed its position before
receiving notice of the accidental disclosure. 52 Thus, in situations where
notice is timely received by the third party, the accidental disclosure of
the information to the third party in a manner that does not make the
information generally known or readily ascertainable is not counted as a
trade secrecy waiving event. 53
Both of the foregoing examples may be labeled Type-C disclosures
because although there was an act of disclosure whereby trade secret
49. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp.
1231, 1254 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
50. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving Trade Secret Disclosures on the Internet Through
Sequential Preservation, 42 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 (2007); 2007 B.C. INTEL. PROP. & TECH F. 091101
(2007) (discussing cases of trade secrets that end up in the hands of third parties who are not the
original misappropriators and proposing an analytical framework for preserving such trades secrets
in some situations where they have subsequently been disclosed).
51. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 758 (1939).
52. UTSA, supra note 6, at § 1(2)(ii)(C). See also MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 7.02[2][b].
53. Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (analyzing effect of inadvertent disclosure
made in e-discovery context).
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information was disclosed to or shared with someone other than the trade
secret owner, the recipients of the information were under a duty not to
further disclose that information; in other words, to keep it confidential.
In the case of the misappropriation, disclosure is a proscribed wrong under
trade secret law. In the case of an accidental disclosure, a duty of
confidentiality can be imposed with timely notice.
Sometimes trade secret rights are lost, not due to actions of the
putative trade secret owner, but pursuant to the proper actions of others;
for instance, if others acquire the trade secrets through reverse engineering
or independent development and then disclose them. 54 This is another
situation where trade secret plaintiffs will proclaim that they never
disclosed the information, which may be true, but it does not matter. If a
third party’s acts of reverse engineering and independent development are
followed by a disclosure of the resulting information in a manner that
makes it generally known or readily ascertainable, then the putative trade
secret owner’s trade secret rights in the same information cease to exist.
A key reason for this rule is that the ability of individuals and companies
to engage in reverse engineering and independent development is what
differentiates trade secret protection from patent protection, thereby
furthering the public disclosure goals of patent law and, in the U.S.,
preventing trade secret law from being preempted by federal patent law. 55
It is also consistent with the general goal of promoting the dissemination
of information and the flourishing of public knowledge.
B.

Patent Law

The U.S. Patent Act uses the word disclosure more than 40 times, but
as with the UTSA and the DTSA, it is not defined in the statute. 56 Also,
like trade secret law, U.S. patent law employs different conceptions of
disclosure and publicness depending upon the context in which the issue
arises and who is doing the disclosing. In nearly all cases where it is used,
the word disclosure is used without the adjective “public” and, when read
in the context of the statutory provisions where the word appears, its usage
is most consistent with a disclosing act that does not necessarily or

54. See MILGRIM, supra note 52 (describing the non-liability of the “honest” discoverer).
55. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
56. Although there are two versions of the U.S. Patent Act which may apply to issued U.S.
patents depending upon whether the corresponding patent applications were filed pre- or post- the
effective date of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), this analysis focuses on the AIA
version.
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immediately make the information public. The provisions of the Patent
Act that are known as the Bayh-Dole Act provide one example of this;
there, disclosure is used to refer to acts by which a federally-funded
inventor discloses (shares) their invention to the federal government, but
under circumstances where the information is kept confidential (a TypeC disclosure). 57 Similarly, under the provisions of the Patent Act dealing
with the ability of the federal government to withhold the publication of
patents for national security purposes, disclosure is used to refer to the
exchange of information between the inventor and the federal
government, and not to the dissemination of the information to the
public. 58 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 122, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) is required to keep patent applications
confidential except as specified, making those that are not published
subject to a statutory duty of confidence.
Under the Patent Act, the dissemination of patent information to the
public arises in two contexts: (1) the requirements for patentability,
particularly 35 U.S.C. § 112, that require patent applicants to disclose
specified and detailed information to the USPTO; and (2) the rules
governing the publication of issued patents and their related
applications. 59 It is with respect to the publication of issued patents and
applications where the information owner’s common understanding of the
word disclosure as meaning public disclosure applies because once a
patent is granted (and in many cases, 18 months after the application is
filed), the details of the issued patent (or application) is published in the
USPTO’s Official Gazette. 60 Indeed, the grant of a patent requires a quid
pro quo whereby an inventor must sufficiently disclose the invention
before a patent will be granted. 61 This is done in what is known as the
specification which “shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which
it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same . . . .” 62 According to the USPTO, the written description and
57. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (using the phrase “disclosure to federal agency”).
58. See 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1999).
59. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 112, 122.
60. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2012).
61. Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Tr. Co., 305 U.S. 47, 57 (1938) (quoting Permutit Co.
v. Graver Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 58 (1931)) (“[35 U.S.C. § 112] require[s] the patentee to describe his
invention so that others may construct and use it after the expiration of the patent and ‘to inform the
public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known
which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license and which may not.’”).
62. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
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enablement requirements of § 112 are separate and distinct requirements,
with the purpose of the enablement requirement being “to ensure that the
invention is communicated to the interested public in a meaningful way. 63
When a patent is granted, the publication of the details of the patent
is a Type-P disclosure because although the information is publicly
disseminated or available, patent protection continues to attach until the
patent rights cease or are held invalid. If the patent is not granted, the
publication of the patent application is a Type-X disclosure because no
patent rights ever attached to the information, unless the information
disclosed in the patent application qualifies for trade secret protection.64
If trade secrets exist in the patent application, then there are two possible
outcomes. First, if the patent is not granted, and provided the patent
application is not published, the filing of the patent application is a TypeC disclosure because the application will be kept confidential. Second, if
the patent is not granted, but the patent application is published, then it is
a Type-L disclosure because the publication destroys the trade secrets.
Another place where the word disclosure is used in the Patent Act is
in 35 U.S.C. § 102, the provision which specifies that a patent will not be
granted for an invention that already exists and is disclosed in the prior
art. 65 It is here where disclosure has at least two different meanings, and
where the applicable concepts of disclosure are sometimes incongruous
with an information owner’s common understanding of disclosure as
involving publicness. To the contrary, under patent prior art
jurisprudence, like trade secret law, it is possible for an act to be treated
as prior art even though it does not result in the public dissemination of
the patentable invention. Pursuant to the Metallizing Engineering
doctrine, for instance, a patent owner’s acts of using an invention in
private in a manner that does not actually disclose the invention to the
public can forfeit patent protection. 66 As explained in Metallizing
Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co.:
[I]t is a condition upon an inventor’s right to a patent that he shall not
exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting; he
must content himself with either secrecy, or legal monopoly. . . . [I]f he

63. U.S. Patent Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2164, The
Enablement Requirement.
64. Some might argue that the publication constitutes a Type-L disclosure because the
information could have remained as a protected trade secret but for the publication of the application
in the Official Gazette. However, I contend that trade secret rights were waived by the patent applicant
upon filing the application, so long as no duty to keep the application confidential applies.
65. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1990).
66. Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946).
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goes beyond the [grace period without filing a patent application], he
forfeits his right regardless of how little the public may have learned
about the invention. 67

Similarly, in Egbert v. Lippman, the Supreme Court considered whether
the use of corset-stays by the inventor’s girlfriend for a period over two
years constituted a patentability-destroying public use even though the
invention was not actually visible to members of the public. 68 It did. Thus,
U.S. patent law’s conception of disclosure is like trade secret law’s
conception; 69 a patentability-disqualifying disclosure can occur when no
information is actually revealed to members of the public.
Inventions are not considered novel under § 102 if, prior to the
effective filing date of the subject patent application, they were: patented,
described in a printed publication, in public use, on sale, or otherwise
available to the public. While the word disclosure is nowhere to be found
in § 102(a), all the listed types of prior art require some degree of
disclosure. As Robert Merges has detailed, there are several different
definitions of (patent-disqualifying) disclosure under patent law that range
from “widespread dissemination” on one end of the spectrum of
disclosure to merely “a move away from complete secrecy.” 70 Which
patent definition of disclosure applies often depends upon who is
engaging in the act of disclosure and the form and manner of the
disclosure. For important policy reasons, the acts of the inventor
(information owner/holder) are more likely to be treated as patent
disqualifying disclosures than if those same acts are engaged in by a third
party, even if the acts of the inventor do not result in a public disclosure
of the subject information.
Although § 102(a) does not contain the word disclosure, subsection
(b) uses it multiple times and in different ways, thereby underscoring the
need to keep the different concepts of disclosure under information law in
mind when determining the legal effect of whichever acts of disclosure
occurred. For instance, in the first instance of use of the word disclosure
in § 102(b)(1)(A), the word disclosure is used alone to describe acts that,
if occurring one year or less before the effective filing date of the subject
application, will not be counted as prior art (specifically disclosures made
by an inventor or joint inventor). In this context, disclosure is a catch-all

67. Id. at 520 (quoting Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, [27 U.S. 1] (1829)).
68. Id. at 336.
69. Camilla A. Hrdy & Sharon K. Sandeen, The Trade Secrecy Standard for Patent Prior Art,
70 AM. U. L. REV. 1269(2021).
70. Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the AIA, 27 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1023 (2012).
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phrase for the list of prior art in § 102(a). 71 For purposes of patent law,
these can be labeled Type-P disclosures because there is still an ability to
protect the disclosed information if a patent application is timely filed, but
for purposes of trade secret law they are either Type-C or Type-L
disclosures depending upon whether they were made pursuant to a duty
of confidence.
The second time the word disclosure is used in § 102(b)(1) is in
subsection (B), but there it is used multiple times; three times alone and
one time in conjunction with the word publicly. It reads:
A disclosure made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a
claimed invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under
subsection (a)(1) if— . . .
(B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been
publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who
obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the
inventor or a joint inventor.

Again, reading the word disclosure in context, when it is used alone it
must mean the same thing as it meant in § 102(b)(1)(A), as a reference to
all the types of prior art that are set forth in § 102(a). The use of the phrase
“publicly disclosed” in § 102(b)(1)(B) then makes sense; it acknowledges
longstanding U.S. patent law principles that some patent prior art has not
been publicly disclosed as that phrase is commonly understood and that
the required act of the inventor must result in a truly “public” disclosure.
In turn, this reading means the language “otherwise available to the
public” in § 102(a) does not mean the same thing as “publicly available,”
but encompasses the broader conception of how information is deemed
available to the public that is a part of U.S. patent (and, indeed, trade
secret) jurisprudence. In short, disclosure in the patent prior art context
does not require publicness.
C.

Copyright Law

United States copyright law is another area of information law where
different conceptions of disclosure exist, but copyright disclosure
jurisprudence is obscured by four interrelated facts. First, the U.S.
Copyright Act, although lengthy and detailed, does not use the word
disclosure much and usually only in the attributive sense. In fact, the

71. US PATENT OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 2152.04,
“The Meaning of ‘Disclosure.’”
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words “disclosure” or “disclose” are used less than ten times throughout
the lengthy statute. Instead, the principal terms of art that are used in the
Copyright Act which relate to disclosing acts and the public availability
of copyright materials are: publication, published, unpublished, and
public domain. Second, of the terms just listed, only publication is defined
in the statute, although unpublished obliviously means that which is not
the subject of a publication as defined. 72 Third, while publication remains
an important concept under U.S. copyright law, it was more important
before January 1, 1978 when the 1976 Copyright Act became effective
and before March 1, 1989 when U.S. copyright law provided that
copyrights did not attach to works of authorship that were published (as
defined) without the requisite notice of copyright. 73 Finally, the deposit
requirement of U.S. Copyright Act requires disclosure of copyright
protected works, but with applicable regulations that allow for specified
works (or portions of work) to be kept secret or confidential. 74
From the foregoing, it is possible for a single copyright protected
work to consist of three types of information: (1) public domain
information (unprotected Type-X information); (2) publicly disclosed, but
Type-P information (that which is within the scope of copyright
protection); and (3) secret information which is not made part of the
deposit of the copyright protected work (Type-P or Type-C). Indeed, it is
common for computer software to be comprised of all three types of
information. However, whether Type-C information exists in a copyright
protected work depends, in addition to the deposit rules, on whether the
information is published and, if not, whether the information was shared
with others pursuant to an obligation of confidentiality. If information in
a work is published such that it becomes generally known or readily
ascertainable, then the publication is a Type-L disclosure. But in contrast
to the broad meanings of disclosure under patent and trade secrets law,
the meaning of published under copyright law is narrower than its
commonly understood meaning.
Before January 1, 1978, copyrights in the U.S. did not automatically
attach to works of authorship fixed in tangible form as they have since,75

72. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
73. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, § 9.
74. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.19–202.24. See also, Diane L. Zimmerman, Trade Secrets and the
‘Philosophy’ of Copyright: A Case of Culture Crash, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE
SECRECY 299 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing 2011)
(discussing the traditional disclosure purposes of U.S. copyright law).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990).
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but only attached when a work was published with notice 76 or registered. 77
This meant that unpublished and unregistered works were not protected
by federal copyright law but may have been protected by common law.
Thus, particularly for works that were unregistered, the definition of
publication under U.S. copyright law was very important because it
determined if copyrights in the work even existed. Publication was also a
very important concept for those who may have published their works
before March 1, 1989 without the requisite copyright notice because, if
the work was deemed to be published without such notice, copyright
protection was lost. 78
Not surprisingly, because the pre-March 1, 1989 copyright notice
requirement worked a forfeiture of rights, the jurisprudence surrounding
the meaning of publication before March 1, 1989 limited its meaning (and
by extension, the meaning of copyright disclosures) by distinguishing
between acts of “general publication” and acts of “limited publication.” 79
Then, in 1976, when a statutory definition of publication was finally
added to U.S. copyright law, similar distinctions and limitations were
codified. 80

76. Copyright Act of 1909 § 9.
77. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. 60–349, 35 Stat. 1075, §§ 10–11.
78. See, e.g., Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899) (finding the lack of separate copyright notice
on essays in a magazine placed essays in the public domain); Mifflin v. Dutton, 190 U.S. 265 (1903)
(finding the lack of separate copyright notice on installments of a book published in a magazine placed
book in the public domain).
79. White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744, 746–47 (9th Cir. 1952) (“[A] limited publication which
communicates the contents of a manuscript to a definitely selected group and for a limited purpose,
and without the right of diffusion, reproduction, distribution or sale, is considered a ‘limited
publication,’ which does not result in loss of the author’s common-law right to his manuscript; but
that the circulation must be restricted both as to persons and purpose, or it cannot be called a private
or limited publication.”); Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321, 324 (2d Cir. 1904)
(“Publication of a subject of copyright is effected by its communication or dedication to the public.
Such a publication is what is known as a ‘general publication.’ There may be also a ‘limited
publication.’”).
80. Copyright Act of 1909 § 9. See also, H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 3 (1976),
https://www.copyright.gov/history/law/clrev_94-1476.pdf [https://perma.cc/E739-3ZNY] (Under the
definition in § 101, a work is “published” if one or more copies or phonorecords embodying it are
distributed to the public-that is, generally to persons under no explicit or implicit restrictions with
respect to disclosure of its contents-without regard to the manner in which the copies or phonorecords
changed hands. The definition clears up the question of whether the sale of phonorecords constitutes
publication, and it also makes plain that any form or dissemination in which a material object does
not change hands-performances or displays on television, for example-is not a publication no matter
how many people are exposed to the work. On the other hand, the definition also makes clear that,
when copies or phonorecords are offered to a group of wholesalers, broadcasters, motion pictures,
etc., publication takes place if the purpose is “further distribution, public performance, or public
display.”).
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The definition of publication (or published) under U.S. copyright law
post the 1978 and 1989 changes to the law remain important because the
Copyright Act is replete with provisions that treat published and
unpublished works differently. 81 But importantly for purposes of this
article, publication under current U.S. copyright law does not necessarily
mean public disclosure, particularly of the widespread variety. Rather,
(and in contrast to the patent law concept of prior art, discussed above),
the applicable definition of publication has been interpreted to be
narrower than the common understanding of the meaning of disclosure.
Section 101 of the U.S. Copyright Act, defines publication as:
[T]he distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The
offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for
purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display,
constitutes publication. A public performance or display of a work does
not of itself constitute publication. 82

On the face of this statutory definition, one can see the requirement of a
sale or other transfer of ownership that is not generally required for public
disclosures of information. As explained by one copyright law scholar:
“[A] sine qua non of publication should be the acquisition by members of
the public of a possessory interest in tangible copies of the work in
question.” 83 As a result, U.S. copyright law’s definition of publication
does not apply to all works that have been publicly disclosed or
disseminated. Indeed, under U.S. copyright law, posting a work of
authorship on the Internet does not constitute a publication, 84 whereas
such an act would likely be considered a public disclosure under trade
secret law. 85
Importantly, publication under current U.S. copyright law (or any
other type of disclosure of a copyright protected work) does not mean the
loss of applicable copyrights, although publication can affect the scope of
those rights. Rather, the loss of copyrights under U.S. copyright law is
81. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 408(b) (2005); 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2008).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
83. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.07[A]
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed., 2021).
84. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 101 (3d
ed. 2017) (“As a general rule, the Office does not consider a work to be published if it is merely
displayed or performed online, unless the author or copyright owner clearly authorized the
reproduction or distribution of that work, or clearly offered to distribute the work to a group of
intermediaries for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display.”).
85. See Rowe, supra note 50.
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typically denoted by the phrase “in the public domain” which—making
copyright law’s disclosure jurisprudence even more confusing—doesn’t
require public dissemination at all but is a term of art that signifies that
copyrights in a work never existed or have come to an end.
Usually, copyrights come to an end because the applicable copyright
term has ended, but authors of works can also announce that they dedicate
their works to the public domain by waiving their copyrights.
Additionally, although expressed in an otherwise copyright protected
work, copyrights never exist in information, whether published or not, that
is not within the scope of copyrighted subject matter. This would include
facts and anything else not protected by copyright law as specified in
§ 102(b) of the Copyright Act. In both cases, the work (or unprotected
portions of the work) is in the public domain in the sense that it can be
freely copied by the public, not in the sense that it has been publicly
disseminated. Thus, it is possible for a U.S. author to write a novel, keep
it secret for her life plus seventy years, and it still will enter the public
domain without ever being published or publicly disclosed.
Although the public domain is a term of art in intellectual property
law that means information is not protected by intellectual property law,
often it is used in common (and scholarly) vernacular to refer to
information that has been publicly disclosed. 86 In such cases, care must
be undertaken to determine if the term is being used in the intellectual
property sense to mean information that is no longer protected by law or,
in the more colloquial sense, to mean information that has been publicly
disclosed. In the context of U.S. copyright law, the words that should be
used to connote public disclosure are either “publication” or “published,”
but as noted, copyright law has its own particular meaning of publication
that does not comport one-for-one with an information owner/holder’s
common understanding of disclosure. This is yet another reason why a
typology of disclosure is needed.
IV. A PROPOSED TYPOLOGY OF DISCLOSURE
The foregoing examination of disclosure principles under various
areas of information law does not provide an obvious answer to the
question of how we should define (or redefine) disclosure. However, it is
86. See, e.g., Coton v. Televised Visual X-Ography, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (M.D. Fla.
2010). See also Monica Gaudio, Copyright Infringement and Me, LIVEJOURNAL.COM (Nov. 3rd,
2010, 11:14 pm), https://illadore.livejournal.com/30674.html [https://perma.cc/34GR-HYNE]
(“Instead, the editor informed [Ms. Gaudio] that ‘the web is considered public domain’, and that [she]
should be happy [Cooks Source] didn’t ‘lift’ [her] whole article and put someone else’s name on it!”).
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important that we try because there is too much misunderstanding and
confusion between an information owner/holder’s common
understanding of the meaning of disclosure and the legal effect of various
disclosing acts. This misunderstanding and confusion often lead to the
assertion of actual or threatened harm that is factually inapplicable, often
occupying the court’s time and attention when it shouldn’t.
As has been shown, in certain areas of information law there is a
strong public policy that favors the waiver of applicable protections
whenever an information owner voluntarily discloses information to a
third-party, regardless of whether the information becomes generally
known or publicly available; in others, there is agreement that certain
types of information are deserving of continued legal protection even if
they are disclosed to the public or, at least, readily available to it; and,
some information law doctrines recognize that certain types of
information are not protected by law even if they are kept secret and
confidential. How should we differentiate between these legal effects?
Borrowing from the idea of a “taxonomy of privacy,” 87 rather than
improve or change the existing definitions and usages of the word
disclosure under law, this article proposes a typology that distinguishes
between acts that result in the loss of applicable rights in information and
acts that do not. Specifically, as previewed above, five different types of
disclosure with new descriptive labels are proposed that, consistent with
the various ways that the word disclosure is used in information law,
connote different legal circumstances and effects. They are:
1. Type-L disclosures: Acts that lead to the loss (or waiver) of
associated legal rights in the disclosed information.

Type-L disclosures include all the ways that applicable rights in
information are lost, including situations where regulated entities and
public contractors are required to disclose specified information
(including trade secrets and confidential information) to the government
as a regulatory condition or a condition of doing business. These are the
types of disclosure that worry information owners/holders the most and
that are most legitimate to be raised in a court of law but that are often not
improper.

87. Solove, supra note 15, at 485 (“[T]he goal [of this taxonomy] is simply to define the
activities [that affect privacy] and explain why and how they can cause trouble. The question of when
and how the law should regulate can only be answered in each specific context in which the question
arises.”).
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2. Type-P disclosures: Acts, often associated with patent and copyright
law but that may also apply in other contexts, that result in the public
dissemination or availability of information but that do not result in the
loss of any associated rights in the subject information.

The letter “P” stands for “protected,” meaning the subject information is
protected by a body of information law (to what extent and under which
circumstances are different questions) even after the information is
disclosed to others or publicly. In addition to patent rights and copyrights,
Type-P disclosures would include information that is required to be
submitted to government regulators and becomes public but is the subject
of applicable data exclusivity rights that restrict certain uses of the
information. 88 It does not include information that is protected by contract,
because that information is a Type-C disclosure.
3. Type-C disclosures: Acts that do not lead to the loss of associated
legal rights because the sharing of information occurs between persons
and entities that owe an obligation of confidentiality imposed by law,
court order, or contract.

The sharing of trade secrets and other confidential information would be
classified as a Type-C disclosure provided the subject information is
confidential or secret and an obligation of confidentiality is established
before the sharing occurs. If no such obligation of confidentiality exists
before sharing, then the act of sharing is likely to constitute a Type-L
disclosure if the information was protected by law before it was shared.
This is the category that best describes confidential information that is
shared pursuant to a Protective Order or a Non-disclosure Agreement
(NDA). Sometimes, however, information that is the subject of a
Protective Order or an NDA does not have legal protection beyond factual
confidentiality or applicable privilege and should properly be labeled
Type-X information (see below).
4. Type-T disclosures: Acts that result in the mere transfer of
information, either in analog or digital form, but that do not result in the
transferred information being read by the transferee.

This category of disclosure has not yet been explicitly recognized by law
but is needed to differentiate between: (a) information which is shared
such that knowledge is or could be acquired by another; and (b) the mere
transfer (often electronically) of information from one place to another.
88. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
Annex 1C, art. 39.3, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M 1197 (1994).
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For this purpose, the word transfer is defined as “to convey or remove
from one place or one person to another; to pass or hand over from one to
another.” 89 Thus, this category could cover information that is stored on
third-party servers in the Cloud or in old-school banker’s boxes or file
cabinets kept at a third-party storage site. 90 Often these business
relationships do not involve express or implied promises of confidentiality
that would allow the transfers of information to be described as Type-C
disclosures, so a different label is needed. However, if there is a breach of
the storage facility, there is a possibility that the information will suffer a
Type-L disclosure.
5. Type-X disclosures: This category of disclosures focuses more on
the type of information and its legal status, rather than the act of
disclosure. It is applicable to acts of disclosure involving information
that is not protected by law for one reason or another. This would
include, for instance: information that is not within the scope of
protected information, information that is in the public domain because
applicable protections have expired, information that is generally known
or readily ascertainable, and information that constitutes prior art under
patent law.

This final type of disclosure is needed to capture the default rule that
information is not protected by law unless the law says it is. Unless
information is protected by an area of information law (for instance, trade
secret, patent, copyright, or privacy law), the law does not provide a
remedy for the unwanted disclosure of that information. Indeed, the strong
public policy of the U.S. is to facilitate the dissemination and use of
information because information is needed to spur creativity and
invention. The owners/holders of Type-X information can always engage
in self-help to protect it, but if it leaks out they have no standing to
complain because, due to the public policy that favors information
diffusion and knowledge acquisition, society doesn’t care about the
unwanted disclosure of legally unprotected information, even if the
information owner/holder subjectively believed that the information was
its secret or confidential information.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR HOW TO USE THE TYPOLOGY
The best way to use the suggested typology is to require information
owners/holders to designate the type of information and information
89.
90.

Id.
Sandeen, supra note 13.
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disclosures that are involved in litigation or other settings where they may
be required or compelled to disclose information. The focus of the labels
is mostly on the character of the disclosure, not the type of information,
except for Type-P and Type-X disclosures which concern the type of legal
protection involved; for instance, patent, copyright, trade secret, data
exclusivity, or none. Just the effort undertaken to label information should
clarify the nature of the designated information, even if more than one
designation might plausibly apply to the subject information. If multiple
designations apply, litigants and courts will know that they are likely
dealing with overlapping rights, which must be sorted through.
From the standpoint of the over-assertion of information rights, and
with the rhetorical power of theft in mind, a designation that information
as either Type-P or Type-X should quickly dispel any fears of improper
disclosure because no rights in the information can be lost. But note that
a determination of whether an information owner/holder’s or a third
party’s previous disclosures rendered information Type-X (no protection)
will require application of applicable information law and the multiple
types of protection destroying acts that may apply to the subject
information, including the broad definitions of disclosure under trade
secret and patent law. It is unlikely that an information owner/holder will
readily admit that its information is Type-X, even if it is, requiring a court
to assess that issue.
Type-C disclosures should not be of major concern to courts and
litigants because they will be undertaken pursuant to applicable duties of
confidentiality, including those imposed by Protective Orders and NDAs.
The critical issues will be determining: (1) if a duty of confidentiality
exists and is enforceable; and (2) the scope of the duty of confidentiality.
This should include a determination of whether the subject information is
indeed confidential, but often duties of confidentiality are agreed to, or
Protective Orders are issued, without a detailed assessment of this issue.
Typically, if an information owner treats information as confidential, it
will be treated as such initially, but subject to later factual findings as part
of a breach of confidentiality claim.
If a breach of confidentiality is later alleged, the critical questions
will be whether the information was and remained confidential. If not, the
information would lose its confidential status either because
confidentiality did not exist when the Protective Order was issued or the
NDA was agreed to (a Type-X disclosure), or confidentiality was
subsequently lost (a Type-L disclosure). Information owners, often allege
a Type-L disclosure when seeking monetary damages in trade secret and
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breach of contract cases, but whether they will prevail on their claims
depends upon the confidential and secret status of the subject information.
Under current trade secret principles, Type-T disclosures may result
in the loss of information rights if reasonable efforts to protect such
information are not undertaken. However, if the law evolves to recognize
a distinction between the disclosure or sharing of information and a “mere
transfer” of such information, then it might be argued that Type-T
disclosures do not result in a loss of any associated information rights.
This is because, as noted above, arguably, Type-L disclosures do not
involve cognition by the recipient of the information. If more disclosing
activities are involved, then a confidentiality obligation should have been
established before there was any transfer or sharing of information. Since
what might be labeled Type-T disclosures are initiated by the information
owner/holder, they should not be heard to complain about the
consequences of their own voluntary actions if a court deems their actions
to be of the Type-L variety.
It is only Type-L disclosures, or the threat of Type-L disclosures, that
legitimately involve the loss of information rights. But because the
information involved will often fall into the Type-P or Type X categories,
a determination of the protected status of the information should always
be made early.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates how the word disclosure and disclosing
activities vary in different areas of law (focusing on patent, copyright, and
trade secret law) and why it is important to understand and correctly apply
the different meanings and concepts. The principal concern is that
information owners spend a lot of time, energy, and court resources
arguing that their rights in information will be lost when in many cases
such an assertion is untrue because: (1) the information is not protected
by any law; (2) the information will be protected by patent or copyright
law even if disclosed; (3) the disclosure is actually a mere transfer of
information; or (4) a Protective Order or other confidentiality obligation
will suffice to protect the information. To make it easier for litigants and
courts to determine when the potential loss of information is truly a
concern, this article sets forth a typology of disclosure that differentiates
between various disclosing activities. Although presented with respect to
the intellectual property laws that are discussed, the typology should be
useful in any context where acts of disclosure are discussed.
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